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Abstract
We consider a setting in which a single divisible good (“cake”) needs to be divided
between n players, each with a possibly different valuation function over pieces of the cake.
For this setting, we address the problem of finding divisions that maximize the social welfare,
focusing on divisions where each player needs to get one contiguous piece of the cake. We
show that for both the utilitarian and the egalitarian social welfare functions it is NP-
hard to find the optimal division. For the utilitarian welfare, we provide a constant factor
approximation algorithm, and prove that no FPTAS is possible unless P=NP. For egalitarian
welfare, we prove that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimum to any factor smaller than
2. For the case where the number of players is small, we provide an FPT (fixed parameter
tractable) FPTAS for both the utilitarian and the egalitarian welfare objectives.
1 Introduction
Consider a town with a central conference hall, erected by the municipality for the benefit of
the townspeople. Different people and organizations wish to use the hall for their events, each
for a possibly different duration. Furthermore, each such event may have its preferences and
constraints on the times when it can take place, e.g. only in the evenings, on weekends, prior to
some date, etc. How should the municipality allocate the hall to the different events? How do
we compute the allocation that maximizes the social welfare provided by this common resource?
A natural setting for analyzing the above problem is that of cake cutting, where a single
divisible good needs to be divided between several players with possibly different preferences
regarding the different parts of the good, or “cake”. The cake cutting problem was first in-
troduced in the 1940’s by Steinhaus [Ste49], where the goal was to give each of the n players
“their due part”, i.e. a piece worth at least 1n of the entire cake by their own measure. (In the
cake cutting literature, this fairness requirement is termed proportionality.) Since then, other
objectives have also been considered, with the majority of them requiring that the division be
“fair”, under some definition of fairness (e.g. envy-freeness).
Here, we address the fundamental problem of maximizing social welfare in cake cutting.
Given a shared resource, the valuation functions of the players for this resource, and a social
welfare function, the problem is to find an allocation that maximizes the welfare. Maximizing
social welfare has been previously considered for dividing a set of discrete indivisible items, each
of which must be given in whole to one player. Here, we consider the problem with a single,
continuously divisible good, and furthermore focus on the case where each player needs to get
a single contiguous piece of the good. The contiguity requirement is natural in many settings,
e.g. dividing time (as in the example above), spectrum, and real-estate.
Results. We show that the problems of maximizing utilitarian and egalitarian welfare are
both NP-hard in the strong sense. For egalitarian welfare, we further show that it is hard to
approximate the optimum to any factor smaller than 2.
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For utilitarian welfare, we provide a constant-factor approximation algorithm (note that the
strong NP-hardness result implies that no FPTAS exists for the problem). Specifically, our
algorithm finds a division with utilitarian welfare within 8+o(1) of the optimum, in polynomial
time. We also show that approximating both the utilitarian and egalitarian welfare is fixed-
parameter-tractable with regards to the parameter n (the number of players).
Finally, we consider the case where the contiguity requirement is dropped, i.e. each player
may get a collection of intervals. For this setting, we show that the situation varies greatly
depending on the model of input. When the valuations are given explicitly to the algorithm,
and are piecewise constant, then the problem can be solved in polynomial time. However, if the
algorithm has only oracle access to the valuations, then it is impossible to do any better than
an n-factor approximation, even if the valuations themselves are piecewise uniform.
Related Work. The problem of maximizing egalitarian welfare when allocating a set of
indivisible goods has been extensively considered in the last 15 years [Woe97, AAWY98, BS06,
CCK09]. The currently known best algorithms are a polynomial-time algorithm achieving an
approximation factor of O(
√
n log3 n) [AS07], and an algorithm obtaining O˜(nǫ) approximation
in time nO(1/ǫ), for any ǫ = Ω( log lognlogn ) [CCK09]. Hardness of approximation for this problem,
however, is proven only for a factor of 2 or less [BD05]. Better approximation guarantees
are known for more restricted settings, e.g. when valuations are restricted to having only one
possible non-zero value for each item [BS06, Fei08]. Envy minimization in this setting has also
been considered in [LMMS04], which showed hardness results as well as an FPTAS for the case
of players with identical preferences. Unlike this body of work, which considers a non-ordered
set of indivisible items, here we consider a single divisible item, and furthermore require that
each player obtain a single contiguous piece of this good.
Cake cutting problems were first introduced in the 1940’s [Ste49], and were studied in many
variants since then. Various algorithms were proposed for the problem, including a number
of “moving knife” algorithms, which perform an infinite number of valuations by continuously
moving a knife over the cake (for some examples, see [Str80, EP84] and [BT95]). In addition
to the algorithmic results, there has also been work on existence theorems [DS61, Str80], lower
bounds for the complexity of such algorithms ([SW03, Str08, Pro09], to mention just a few),
and a number of books on the subject, e.g. [BT96, RW98].
The issue of social welfare in cake cutting was first considered in Caragiannis et al. [CKKK09]
which aimed to quantify the degradation in social welfare that may be caused by different fair-
ness requirements; the same question was studied for connected pieces in [AD10]. Guo and
Conitzer [GC10], and Han et al. [HSTZ11] study the utilitarian welfare achievable by truth-
ful mechanisms for dividing a set of divisible goods, a setting very similar to a cake with
piecewise-constant valuations and non-connected pieces. Cohler et al. [CLPP11] study utilitar-
ian welfare maximization under the envy-freeness requirement (with non-connected pieces). Bei
et al. [BCH+12] consider a similar question, but with connected pieces, and with proportional-
ity replacing envy-freeness. Also related is the work of Zivan [Ziv11] which suggests a way for
increasing utilitarian welfare using trust.
2 Model and Definitions
Valuation Functions. In our model, the cake is represented by the interval [0, 1]. Each
player i ∈ [n] (where [n] = {1, . . . , n}) has a non-atomic (additive) measure vi(·), mapping each
measurable subset of [0, 1] to its value according to player i. For most of this work, we are only
interested in a value of intervals in [0, 1], and thus simply write vi(a, b) for the value of the
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interval between a and b. (Note that since vi is non-atomic, single points have zero value, and
we need not worry about the boundary points a and b themselves.)
We also assume, as common in the cake-cutting literature, that the valuations are normal-
ized, i.e. that vi(0, 1) = 1 for every player i. However, our results hold (with small modifications
to the algorithms or complexity) for arbitrary valuations as well.
Social Welfare Functions. We consider two prominent social welfare functions, whose aim
is to measure how good each division is for the whole society. Let x be a division (to be
formally defined shortly); we write ui(x) to express the value player i obtains from the piece
she receives in x. The utilitarian welfare is defined as the sum of utilities, and we denote
u(x) =
∑
i∈[n] ui(x). The egalitarian welfare is defined as the utility of the worst-off player, and
we denote eg(x) = mini∈[n] ui(x).
Connected Divisions. In this work, we focus on divisions in which every player gets a
(disjoint) single interval of the cake. Formally, a connected division of the cake [0, 1] between n
players can be defined as a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn−1, π) ∈ [0, 1]n−1 × Sn (where Sn is the set of
all the permutations of [n]), having x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn−1. This is interpreted as making n− 1
cuts in positions x1, . . . , xn−1, and allocating the n resulting intervals to the players in the order
determined by the permutation π. Note that the space X of all such divisions is compact; in
addition, both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare functions are continuous in X (as the players’
valuation functions are all non-atomic). Therefore, for each of these welfare functions there
exists a division that maximizes the welfare.
Our main problem is thus the following: given the players’ valuations, what is the (connected)
division that maximizes welfare? Since the two welfare functions considered here obtain maxima
in the divisions space, the problem is indeed well-defined. For the analysis of these problems,
it is useful to consider their decision versions, defined as follows.
Connected Utilitarian Optimum (CUO)
Instance: A set {vi}ni=1 of non-atomic measures on [0, 1], and a bound B.
Problem: Does there exist a connected division x having u(x) ≥ B?
Connected Egalitarian Optimum (CEO)
Instance: A set {vi}ni=1 of non-atomic measures on [0, 1], and a bound B.
Problem: Does there exist a connected division x having eg(x) ≥ B?
Complexity and Input Models. In order to analyze the complexity of our problems, we
must first define how the input is represented. In most of the cake cutting literature, the
mechanism is not explicitly given the players’ valuation functions; instead, it can query the
players on their valuations (see e.g. [EP84, RW98, Str08]). Typically, two types of queries are
allowed. In the first, a player i is given points 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 and is required to return the value
vi(a, b). In the second type of query, a player i is given a point a ∈ [0, 1] and a value x and is
required to return a point b such that vi(a, b) = x; we denote this by v
−1
i (a, x).
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In contrast, some more recent works (e.g. [CLPP10, CLPP11, BCH+12]) consider a model in
which the players give complete descriptions of their valuations to the mechanism. In this case,
it is usually assumed that the functions have some simple structure, so they can be represented
1Note that using only one type of query it is possible to give approximate answers (in polynomial time) to
queries of the other type using binary search.
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succinctly. Specifically, for each player i, let νi : [0, 1] → [0,∞) be a value density function, such
that
vi(X) =
∫
X
νi(x)dx
for every measurable subset X ∈ [0, 1]. Following [CLPP10], we say that a valuation function
vi(·) is piecewise-constant if its value density function νi(·) is a step function, i.e. if [0, 1] can
be partitioned into a finite number of intervals such that νi is constant on each interval. If, in
addition, there is some constant ci such that νi(·) can only attain the values 0 or ci, we say that
vi(·) is piecewise-uniform.2 Any piecewise-constant valuation function vi(·) can be therefore
represented by a finite set of subintervals of [0, 1] together with the value νi attains in each
interval.
Our hardness results show that both of the decision problems above are computationally
hard, even when the valuation functions are of the simplest type—piecewise-uniform—and are
given explicitly to the mechanism. In contrast, our positive algorithmic results hold also for
the more general oracle model. The complexity of our algorithms in this case depends on the
number of players n and additionally on a precision parameter ǫ.
The Discrete Variants. A convenient preprocessing step in our algorithms will be reducing
our problems into ones that are purely combinatorial. More precisely, we consider discrete
analogues of the problems, where one is additionally given a set of points in [0, 1], and is only
allowed to make cuts at points from this set (and not anywhere in [0, 1]). An alternative
interpretation is to consider, instead of a continuous cake, a sequence of indivisible items; a
connected division in this setting gives each player a consecutive subsequence of these items.
The discrete variants of our problems are defined as follows:
Discrete Connected Utilitarian Optimum (Discrete-CUO)
Instance: A sequence A = (a1, . . . , am) of items, a set {vi}ni=1 of valuation func-
tions of the form vi : A→ R+, and a bound B.
Problem: Does there exist a connected division x having u(x) ≥ B?
Discrete Connected Egalitarian Optimum (Discrete-CEO)
Instance: A sequence A = (a1, . . . , am) of items, a set {vi}ni=1 of valuation func-
tions of the form vi : A→ R+, and a bound B.
Problem: Does there exist a connected division x having eg(x) ≥ B?
Our hardness results apply to these “cleaner” problems as well. We note that if we drop the
contiguity requirement, allowing players to get any disjoint subsets of A, maximizing utilitarian
welfare becomes trivial (give each item to the player who values it the most). In contrast,
maximizing egalitarian welfare (in the discrete setting with non-connected pieces) is known to
be a hard problem [BD05] and has been studied extensively (e.g. [AS07, CCK09]).
3 Approximation Algorithms
In this section we present algorithms that return a division that is guaranteed not to be too far
from the social optimum. Throughout this section we assume that the algorithms operate in
the (more-general) oracle model. We note that if the valuation functions are given explicitly,
and are simple enough (in particular, if they are piecewise-constant), the answer to each oracle
query can be computed in time polynomial in the input size.
2Note that in this case the constant ci is uniquely determined by the total fraction of [0, 1] in which νi(x) 6= 0,
since we require that the valuation of the entire cake should be 1.
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3.1 The Discretization Procedure
As we have previously mentioned, it is often useful to reduce the continuous cake into a sequence
of discrete items. We now show that this can indeed be done in a time-efficient manner, and
without too much harm to the maximum obtainable welfare. Algorithm 1 below receives a cake
instance and a parameter ǫ, and produces a set of cut positions that partition the cake into a
set of items. At each point, let a be the position of the last (rightmost) cut. Algorithm 1 asks
each player i for the leftmost point bi such that the value vi(a, bi) = ǫ; it then makes a cut at
the leftmost of these points, and repeats the process.
Algorithm 1: Discretization Procedure
Data: Oracle access to vi(·) for each player i ∈ [n], and ǫ > 0.
begin
a←− 0
C ←− {0}
while ∃i : vi(a, 1) > ǫ do
for i ∈ [n] do
bi ←− v−1i (a, ǫ)
b←− mini bi
C ←− C ∪ {b}
a←− b
C ←− C ∪ {1}
return C
Note that the set of cuts C produced by the algorithm induces a sequence of items. Specif-
ically, let 0 = c0 < c1 < · · · < cm = 1 be the cut points in C; then, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m create
an item aj with value vi(aj) = vi(cj−1, cj) for player i ∈ [n].
The following lemma establishes that the set C can be computed efficiently, and that we do
not lose much utilitarian welfare by restricting our cuts positions to C. We note that a similar
claim also holds for egalitarian welfare.
Lemma 1. Let {vi(·)}i∈[n] be a cake instance with n players, and consider some precision
parameter ǫ. Then:
1. Algorithm 1 terminates on this instance in time O(n2/ǫ).
2. Let x be a division of the original cake; then there exists a division y making cuts only at
points in the set C returned by Algorithm 1, and having u(y) ≥ u(x)− (n− 1)ǫ.
Proof. For item (1), note that in each iteration of the while-loop, the value
∑
i∈[n] vi(a, 1)
decreases by at least ǫ; since at the beginning of the algorithm
∑
i∈[n] vi(a, 1) = n, there can
be at most O(n/ǫ) iterations. The claim follows by noting that in each iteration we make 2n
queries to the oracles.
For item (2), let x be a division of the cake. We define the division y by setting yj to be
the leftmost point c ∈ C having c ≥ xj , for each cut xj in the division x (the order of the
allocation in y is similar to that of x). Let k be the player getting the leftmost piece in both
divisions; clearly uk(y) ≥ uk(x). Since for any two consecutive cuts c′, c′′ ∈ C and any player i,
vi(c
′, c′′) ≤ ǫ, we also have that for all other players i 6= k it holds that ui(y) ≥ ui(x) − ǫ, and
(2) follows immediately.
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3.2 Approximating the Utilitarian Welfare
We now present an approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing utilitarian welfare;
the approximation ratio achieved by our algorithm is 8
(
1 + (n − 1)ǫ), where ǫ is a precision
parameter, and the running time of the algorithm is polynomial in n and in 1/ǫ. As a first
step, the algorithm uses the discretization procedure (Algorithm 1) and obtains a set A of m
discrete items. We now describe how to approximate the optimal utilitarian welfare for this
new instance. The algorithm returns a set {(si, ti)}i∈[n], where si is the beginning index of i’s
piece, and ti is its end index. We also use the notation (s, t) to refer to the consecutive sequence
of items {s, s + 1, . . . , t− 1, t}; hence, e.g. vi(s, t) =
∑t
j=s vi(j).
Algorithm 2: Discrete Utilitarian Welfare Approximation
Data: For each player i ∈ [n] a vector of valuations vi : [m]→ R+.
begin
∀i ∈ [n] : si ←− 0 , ti ←− 0
for t = 1, . . . ,m do
while maxk∈[n],s≤t
{
vk(s, t)− 2
(
vk(sk, tk) + V−k(s, t)
)}
≥ 0
do
k′, s′ ←− arguments maximizing the expression
sk′ ←− s′ , tk′ ←− t
(si, ti)←− (0, 0) for all i with si ≥ s′
ti ←− s′ − 1 for i with si < s′ ≤ ti
return
{
(si, ti)
}
i∈[n]
Our algorithm for the discretized instance works iteratively, where in the t-th iteration it
finds a good division for the first t items. We begin with the trivial null allocation of 0 items.
Assuming that we have a good allocation for the first t− 1 items, and for all s ≤ t and k ∈ [n],
we consider the cost of giving items s through t to player k. This cost is comprised of two
components. The first component is the value of a piece (sk, tk) that player k may currently
own, and has to give up in order to get the new piece (s, t). The second component is the sum
of values that the other players to which the items s through t are assigned obtain from these
items. We denote this second component by V−k(s, t). We only give the segment (s, t) to player
k if her total value vk(s, t) for this segment is at least twice the cost of giving her this segment.
We continue trying to find a player k′ and a segment (s′, t) ending at item t whose value exceeds
twice the cost, and make changes until there are no such player and segment, at which point
we move on to the next item t+ 1.
Observe that in the algorithm, each interval (s, t) can be given to player i at most once;
this immediately implies that the running time of the algorithm is polynomial in the number of
players n and the number of items m. For analyzing the approximation ratio of the algorithm,
we use indicator variables xji , for i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]. At each step in the algorithm, we will
have xji = 1 if and only if player i owned the item j at some point until now.
Lemma 2. At any iteration t of the above algorithm, we have
∑
i∈[n]
vi(si, ti) ≤
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
xji · vi(j) ≤ 2 ·
∑
i∈[n]
vi(si, ti)
(where the values are as in the end of the t-th iteration).
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Proof. The first inequality trivially holds, and we prove the second by induction on t. The
second inequality clearly holds at the beginning of the step t = 1; we show that if it holds at the
beginning of some step t, then it must still hold at the end of this step. At the beginning of the t-
th step, item t is unallocated. If the while loop was not executed even once in this iteration, none
of the expressions
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m] x
i
j · vi(j) and
∑
i∈[n] vi(si, ti) has changed, and the claim still
holds. Otherwise, consider some iteration of the while loop. In such an iteration, the increase in∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m] x
j
i · vi(j) is upper-bounded by vk′(s′, t). The expression
∑
i∈[n] vi(si, ti) also gains
vk′(s
′, t), but in addition loses vk(sk, tk) + V−k(s, t); however, from the while loop condition we
have that vk′(s
′, t)− (vk(sk, tk) + V−k(s, t)) ≥ 12 · vk′(s′, t). Therefore, the increase to the right-
hand side of the inequality is at least as large as that of the left-hand side, and the inequality
is maintained. Since this holds for every iteration of the while loop, this still holds at the end
of step t, as required.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 2 returns an 8-approximation of the discrete utilitarian optimum.
Proof. Fix an instance, let
{
(sAi , t
A
i )
}
i∈[n]
be the algorithm’s final output on this instance, and
let
{
(s∗i , t
∗
i )
}
i∈[n]
be the optimal division, with total utility OPT =
∑
i∈[n] vi(s
∗
i , t
∗
i ).
For every player k, consider the iteration t∗k, in which the rightmost item given to k in the
optimal division was first considered. Let (s′k, t
′
k) be the segment given to player k at the end of
this iteration. When iteration t∗k ends, it has to be that vk(s
∗
k, t
∗
k) ≤ 2
(
vk(s
′
k, t
′
k) + V−k(s
∗
k, t
∗
k)
)
(where V−k(s
∗
k, t
∗
k) is with respect to the division set by the algorithm at this point). Note that
vk(s
′
k, t
′
k) =
∑t′
k
j=s′
k
xkj · vk(j) and that V−k(s∗k, t∗k) ≤
∑t∗
k
j=s∗
k
∑
i 6=k x
i
j · vi(j). Combining all this,
we get
OPT =
∑
k∈[n]
vk(s
∗
k, t
∗
k) ≤
∑
k∈[n]
2 ·
( t′k∑
j=s′
k
xkj · vk(j) +
t∗
k∑
j=s∗
k
∑
i 6=k
xij · vi(j)
)
= 2 ·
( ∑
k∈[n]
t′
k∑
j=s′
k
xkj · vk(j) +
∑
k∈[n]
t∗
k∑
j=s∗
k
∑
i 6=k
xij · vi(j)
)
≤ 2 ·
( ∑
k∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
xkj · vk(j) +
∑
k∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
xkj · vk(j)
)
= 4 ·
∑
k∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
xkj · vk(j) ≤ 8 ·
∑
i∈[n]
vi(s
A
i , t
A
i ) .
The second inequality holds since for every k 6= k′ the segments (s∗k, t∗k) and (s∗k′ , t∗k′) are disjoint,
as
{
(s∗i , t
∗
i )
}
i∈[n]
is a division. The last inequality follows from Lemma 2.
Combining Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 we get:
Corollary 2. For every ǫ > 0, it is possible to find a division achieving utilitarian welfare
within 8
(
1 + (n− 1)ǫ) of the optimum in time polynomial in n and 1/ǫ.
3.3 Fixed-Parameter Tractable Approximations
Suppose that we have a relatively small number of players n, but that the social efficiency
of the division is of much importance. We show that divisions that are within a factor of
1 + ǫ of the social optimum (for both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare) can be computed in
7
time exponential in the number of players, but polynomial in 1ǫ .
3 Using the terminology of the
theory of Parametrized Complexity [DF99] we say that these approximations are fixed-parameter
tractable with respect to the number of players n.
Theorem 3. For every ǫ > 0, it is possible to find a division achieving utilitarian welfare within
1 + ǫ of the optimum in time 2n · poly(n, 1ǫ ).
Proof. We begin by transforming the cake into a set A = {a1, . . . , am} of discrete items, by
running the discretization procedure (Algorithm 1). We then use dynamic programming to find
the utilitarian optimal division for the discretized instance. We create a table U having a row
of length m for each pair (S, k), where S ⊆ [n] is a non-empty subset of players, and k ∈ S.
Denote by u
(S,k)
j the value in the j-th column of row (S, k) in U . The value u
(S,k)
j will be the
largest total utility obtainable by dividing the first j items between the players of S, where the
last item j is given to player k. Therefore, the maximum utilitarian welfare in the discretized
instance is maxS,k
{
u
(S,k)
m
}
.
It therefore remains to show how the values in U can be computed. We begin with the first
column. For every k ∈ [n], we have u({k},k)1 = vk(a1); for any S 6= {k} the pair (S, k) is invalid
and we set u
(S,k)
1 = −∞. Now, suppose that we have filled in the values in the first j columns,
and consider u
(S,k)
j+1 . If k /∈ S, again (S, k) is invalid, and we set u(S,k)j+1 = −∞. If k ∈ S, then
the maximum value is obtained by either extending k’s piece in the best division of the items 1
through j in which k is gets item j, or by taking the best division of items 1 through j between
the players S \ {k}, and giving item j + 1 to k. Formally,
u
(S,k)
j+1 = max
{
u
(S,k)
j + vk(aj+1) , max
i∈S\{k}
{
u
(S\{k},i)
j
}
+ vk(aj+1)
}
.
We get that the value of each table entry can be computed in time O(n), and therefore filling
the entire table U and finding the utilitarian optimum can be done in time 2n · poly(n, 1ǫ ), as
stated. Once we have the approximated welfare, the actual division can be easily computed by
backtracking.
Theorem 4. For every ǫ > 0, it is possible to find a division achieving egalitarian welfare
within 1 + ǫ of the optimum in time 2n · n · log2
(
n
ǫ
)
.
Proof. We first show an additive ǫ-approximation to the egalitarian welfare that works as follows.
Let B ∈ [0, 1] be our goal egalitarian welfare. We construct a vector C of cut positions, with
one entry for every non-empty subset S ⊆ [n] of players; the value C(S) will be the leftmost
point a ∈ [0, 1] such that it is possible to divide the interval [0, a] between the players of S
and have each i ∈ S have utility B. Clearly, the egalitarian welfare B is feasible if and only if
C
(
[n]
) ≤ 1.
We now show how to compute the values of C. First, for each i ∈ [n], we can set C({i}) =
v−1i (0, B). Suppose that for k < n we have filled all the entries C(S) for |S| ≤ k. Let S be
such that |S| = k + 1; then C(S) = mini∈S v−1i
(
C(S \ {i}), B) (if there is no such value, we
can mark C(S) = ∞). Therefore, each entry can be computed in time O(n); by using binary
search, we can find a value B within an additive distance of ǫ of the egalitarian optimum in
log2
(
1
ǫ
)
iterations.
Now, note that the optimal egalitarian welfare is at least 1n , since a proportional division
(which has at least this welfare) is guaranteed to exist. Therefore, by continuing the binary
3Recall that we assume the oracle model; if the valuation functions are given explicitly, we also have polynomial
dependence on the size of the input.
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search for log2 n more iterations, we can find a value of B which is within a (1−ǫ)-multiplicative
factor of the optimum, and the stated complexity follows. As in the previous algorithm, the
actual division can be easily computed by backtracking.
4 Hardness
We show that all of the four problems defined in Section 2 are NP-complete in the strong sense.
Note that membership in NP is straightforward, as a division achieving the required welfare
can serve as a witness for that instance; we thus concentrate on proving hardness.
4.1 Hardness of Maximizing Egalitarian Welfare
We prove that CEO is strongly NP-complete and hard to approximate to a factor of 2 − ǫ for
any ǫ > 0. We show this using a reduction from the classic problem of 3DM [GJ79]. In this
problem, one is given three sets X,Y,Z of cardinality n each, as well as a set E ⊆ X × Y × Z,
and needs to decide whether there exists a subset E′ ⊆ E of cardinality n that covers X,Y and
Z.
Our reduction borrows its main ideas from the proofs of Beza´kova´ and Dani [BD05] for non-
connected divisions in the discrete setting, which itself uses ideas from Lenstra, Shmoys and
Tardos [LST90]. However, the adjustment to the continuous setting with connected divisions is
somewhat intricate and needs to be done carefully.
Theorem 5. CEO and Discrete-CEO are NP-complete in the strong sense. Furthermore,
for every ǫ > 0 there is no (2− ǫ) approximation for either of the problems, unless P=NP.
This holds even if the valuation functions of the players are piecewise-uniform, and are given
explicitly to the algorithm.
Proof. We show a polynomial-time reduction from 3DM toCEO. LetX,Y,Z and E ⊆ X×Y×Z
be an input to 3DM. We construct a set of piecewise-constant valuations and a bound B as an
input for CEO; this instance can be transformed into an equivalent one with piecewise-uniform
valuations.
For convenience, we take the cake to be the interval
[
0, 2|E|] rather than [0, 1]. We will
think of the cake as being sectioned into |E| “sections” of length 2, where the second unit of
each section is used for separation from the next section.4 The set of players we create has
players of three types: “triplet players”, “ground sets players” and “separation players”. In
what follows we describe the valuation functions of all the players, by their type; for the bound,
we set B = 1|E| .
• Triplet Players: We create a player for every z ∈ Z. For each ei ∈ E such that z
appears in the triplet ei, the player created for z has value of
1
2|E| for each of the intervals(
2(i− 1), 2(i − 1) + 14
)
and
(
2(i− 1) + 34 , 2(i− 1) + 1
)
in the left half of the i-th section.
Denote by mz the number of such triplets ei in E. To keep the value of the entire cake
at 1 for each player, we will divide the missing value 1 − mz|E| between the right halves of
all sections. Specifically, player z will additionally have value |E|−mz2|E|2 for every interval(
2(j − 1) + 65 , 2(j − 1) + 75
)
and
(
2(j − 1) + 85 , 2(j − 1) + 95
)
, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |E|.
4Indeed, the last section needs not have such a unit; however, we leave it there in order to treat it identically
to all the other sections.
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• Ground Sets Players: For x ∈ X, let mx be the number of triplets in E in which x
appears. We create mx− 1 identical players for x. For every ei ∈ |E| such that x appears
in ei, all of x’s players will have valuation of
1
|E| for the interval
(
2(i− 1)+ 14 , 2(i− 1)+ 12
)
in the left half of the i-th section. Again, in order to complement these valuations to 1,
they will also assign a value of |E|−mx
2|E|2
for each of the intervals
(
2(j − 1) + 65 , 2(j − 1)+ 75
)
and
(
2(j − 1) + 85 , 2(j − 1) + 95
)
, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |E|.
We similarly create my − 1 identical players for every y ∈ Y . For each ei ∈ E in which y
appears we have these players give value of 1|E| to the interval
(
2(i−1)+ 12 , 2(i−1)+ 34
)
, and
complement this by giving value of
|E|−my
2|E|2
to each of the intervals
(
2(j−1)+ 65 , 2(j−1)+ 75
)
and
(
2(j − 1) + 85 , 2(j − 1) + 95
)
, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |E|.
• Separation Players: We finally create 3|E| separation players. For every segment 1 ≤
i ≤ |E| we have a player s3i−2 have valuation of 1 for the interval
(
2(j−1)+1, 3(j−1)+ 65
)
,
another player s3i−1 have valuation 1 for
(
2(i − 1) + 75 , 2(i − 1) + 85
)
, and a third player
s3i have valuation 1 for
(
2(i − 1) + 95 , 2(j − 1) + 2
)
.
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the preferences in one segment. In this example, we
consider some triplet ei = (xj , yk, zℓ) ∈ E, and show the section of the cake created for it, with
the preferences of the players who desire some piece of it.
1
2|E|
1
2|E|
zℓ zℓ
1
|E|
1
|E|
all xj players all yk players
❅
❅❘
 
 ✠
1 1 1
s3i−2 s3i−1 s3i
✻ ✻
worth < 1
2|E| to all
non-separation players
Figure 1: The valuations of the players for the section created for ei = (xj , yk, zℓ) ∈ E. Note
that there are mxj − 1 identical players for xj and myk − 1 identical players for yk.
It is straightforward to observe that the construction above can be carried out in polynomial
time. Also, all the numbers created in this instance can be represented by a number of bits
logarithmic in the input size.
Suppose that (X,Y,Z,E) ∈3DM, and let E′ ⊆ E be a cover of X ∪ Y ∪ Z. For each
z ∈ Z there is a unique ei ∈ E′ in which z appears. Give the (unique) triplet player z the
left half of the i-th section
(
2(i− 1), 2(i − 1) + 1). Next, consider the ground sets players. For
every x ∈ X, there is a unique ei ∈ E′ in which x appears; hence, there are mx − 1 triplets
ej ∈ E \ E′ in which x appears. Since no piece of the corresponding sections was given so far,
we can give an interval of the form
(
2(j − 1), 2(j − 1) + 12
)
to each of x’s players. Similarly, we
have my − 1 sections corresponding to ej ∈ E \ E′ for ej ’s that contain y in which the interval(
2(j − 1)+ 12 , 2(j − 1)+ 1
)
is still available (and is worth 1|E| to all of y’s players). This satisfies
all the ground-sets players as well. Note that so far we have only given out the left half of each
section; therefore, we can give each separation player her entire (single and unique) desired
piece, dividing the parts between them arbitrarily. This gives each of them utility of 1. We
obtain that the division above indeed provides each player a piece of value at least B = 1|E| .
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Conversely, suppose that (X,Y,Z,E) /∈3DM; we wish to prove that in this case, no division
has egalitarian welfare > 12|E| . Since (X,Y,Z,E) /∈3DM, it has to be that in every E′ ⊆ E of
cardinality n that covers all of Z, there is either some x ∈ X or some y ∈ Y that appears twice.
Consider the egalitarian welfare maximizing division. Note that an interval containing a desired
piece of a separation player could not be given to any other player, as this would starve that
separation player completely, and the egalitarian welfare will be 0. Hence, if any non-separation
player gets a piece which intersects the right half of some section, this piece must be of value
strictly smaller than 12|E| (or it would contain the entire desired piece of some separation player),
and we are done. If this is not the case, then each non-separation player must get her piece from
the left half of some section. Assume, towards contradiction, that each such player is given a
piece of value at least 12|E| + ǫ for some ǫ > 0. This means that each z player gets a piece that
contains the interval
(
2(i− 1) + 14 , 2(i− 1) + 34
)
, and in particular consumes the desired pieces
of all the ground players in this half-section. Let E′ be the set of ei’s such that some triplet
player has received her piece from the i-th section. This is a subset of E of size n that covers Z,
and hence contains some x ∈ X or y ∈ Y twice; suppose w.l.o.g. that it is x. We have mx − 1
ground set players created for x, all interested in a total of mx intervals. However, at least two
of these intervals are fully consumed by triplet players. Thus, at least two of x’s players must
share a desired interval, and hence at least one of these players gets a piece of value at most
1
2|E| ; a contradiction. We conclude that if (X,Y,Z,E) /∈3DM, no partition can provide all the
players with a piece of value more than 12|E| .
Note that in the instance we created, every player has the same value density for all of her
desired intervals intersecting with those of other players. Therefore, for each player i, we can
rescale the physical size of her other desired intervals (i.e. those that only player i is interested
in), so that νi has a unique value whenever it is not zero, while maintaining the total value of
every desired interval. Note that this does not change anything (except the cut locations) in
the proof above, and therefore the proof holds for piecewise-uniform valuations as well.
The proof for Discrete-CEO is analogous, and can easily be obtained by a straightforward
partitioning of the cake created in the reduction into discrete indivisible chunks.
To prove the hardness of maximizing utilitarian welfare, we show a reduction fromDiscrete-
CEO. However, it is convenient to show this reduction in two steps: we first define a new
problem, to which Discrete-CEO can be easily reduced, and then reduce this problem to
CUO and Discrete-CUO. Our “auxiliary problem” is the following:
Multiple-Choice Segment Packing (MC-Segment-Packing)
Instance: An integer m, and sets A1, . . . , An of segments of [m].
Problem: Does there exist a set S ⊆ ⋃i∈[n]Ai of n disjoint segments having
|S ∩Ai| = 1 for all i?
Given an instance of Discrete-CEO, we can define each Ai as the set of consecutive
subsequences of A = [m] (the sequence of items) with value at least the threshold B to i. This
yields (in polynomial time) an instance ofMC-Segment-Packing for which the answer is “yes”
if and only if the original instance (for Discrete-CEO) was a “yes” instance. In this sense,
MC-Segment-Packing can be thought of as a “cleaner” generalization of Discrete-CEO,
which abstracts away the item values, and just divides all possible segments to “acceptable”
and “non-acceptable” ones.
By the observation above, we immediately get thatMC-Segment-Packing is NP-complete.
We now show that maximizing utilitarian welfare is hard using a reduction fromMC-Segment-
Packing.
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Theorem 6. CUO and Discrete-CUO are NP-complete in the strong sense.
This holds even if the valuation functions of the players are piecewise-uniform, and are given
explicitly to the algorithm.
Proof. We show a polynomial-time transformation fromMC-Segment-Packing to CUO; as in
the egalitarian case, the proof can be easily modified to work for the discrete version Discrete-
CUO as well. Given an integer m and sets A1, . . . , An of segments of [m], we create an instance
of CUO; again, we first create an instance with piecewise-uniform valuations.
For convenience, we take the cake to be the interval
[
0,m+ 2 ·∑i∈[n] |Ai| − 2n]. We think
of the cake as being composed of two parts: the part [0,m] is the “segments range”, and the
remainder is the “compensation range”, which itself will divided into different regions, one for
each set of segments Ai. We will set the bound to B =
4
3
∑
i∈[n] |Ai| − n. It remains to create
the players and their preferences.
For each set Ai of segments we create “segment players” p
1
i , . . . , p
|Ai|
i and “separation players”
q1i , . . . , q
|Ai|−1
i . We denote Ci = m + 2 ·
∑
i′<i (|Ai′ | − 1); the players created for Ai will only
have non-zero values in the interval [0,m] (the “segments range”) and in the interval [Ci, Ci +
2(|Ai| − 1)] (Ai’s “compensation range”). We now describe these preferences in detail.
• Ai’s segment players: Let s1i , . . . , s|Ai|i be the segments of Ai, and denote by b(sji ) the
beginning index of sji , and by e(s
j
i ) its ending index.
Every player pji for some 1 ≤ j ≤ |Ai| has value 13 for the interval
(
b(sji ) − 1, e(sji )
)
. In
addition, each such player will have non-zero value for two more intervals in the “com-
pensation range”: Player p1i will have value
1
3 for each of the intervals (Ci+1, Ci+2) and
(Ci + 3, Ci + 4). Player j, for 2 ≤ j ≤ |Ai| − 1, will have value 13 for each of the intervals
(Ci+2Ci− 3, S +2j− 2) and (Ci+2j− 1, Ci+2j). Finally, player p|Ai|i will have value 13
for each of the intervals (Ci+2|Ai| − 5, Ci+2|Ai| − 4) and (Ci+2|Ai| − 3, Ci+2|Ai| − 2).
These players will have zero value for the rest of the cake.
• Ai’s separation players: Each of these players has non-zero value for only one interval
in Ai’s compensation range, and no value for any other part of the cake. Specifically, for
every 1 ≤ j ≤ |Ai| − 1, player qji has value 1 for the interval (Ci + 2j − 2, Ci + 2j − 1).
Figure 2 shows the structure of the players of one set Ai (in this example, having |Ai| = 7)
in the compensation range.
1 1 1 1 1 1
q1i q
2
i q
3
i q
4
i q
5
i q
6
i
1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
p1i p
2
i p
3
i p
4
i p
5
i p
6
i p
7
i
✻✏✏
✏✏✶
✑✑✸ ✑✑✸ ✑✑✸ ✑✑✸ ✑✑✸◗◗❦ ◗◗❦ ◗◗❦ ◗◗❦ ◗◗❦ PP
PP✐
✻
Figure 2: The valuations of the players of one set Ai in the compensation range. Each segment
player pji has an additional piece of value 1/3 in the segments part (not shown here).
Clearly, the transformation can be computed in polynomial time; also note that the numbers
created in this instance are all bounded by a polynomial of m and n.
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It thus remains to show that a division of utilitarian welfare at least B exists in such an
instance if and only if we can choose a set of n disjoint segments from
⋃
i∈[n]Ai such that exactly
one segment is chosen from each Ai.
Suppose first that we can indeed choose n such segments; we now describe a division of the
cake. First, give each separation player her (single and unique) desired interval (in whole). This
contributes
∑
i∈[n] |Ai| − n to the welfare. Now, for every Ai, let ski be the segment chosen for
the packing. We give player pki the interval
(
b(ski ) − 1, e(ski )
)
; this is possible, since all these
segments are disjoint. To each player pji with j < k we give the interval (Ci + 2j − 1, Ci + 2j),
and to each player pji with j > k we give the interval (Ci + 2j − 3, Ci + 2j − 2). This gives
every segment player utility of 13 , and contributes the missing amount of
1
3
∑
i∈[n] |Ai| to the
utilitarian welfare.
Suppose now that there exists a division with utilitarian welfare of B. We complete the proof
by showing that for every Ai the maximum contribution of the players of Ai to the utilitarian
welfare is 43 · |Ai| − 1, and that this contribution is achievable if and only if at least one of the
segment players of Ai gets all her complete desired interval from the segments range.
Fix some i, and consider the players created for the set Ai. Note first that to maximize the
sum of utilities of these players, no segment player can have utility exceeding 13 . This holds
because any piece worth more to such a player will necessarily contain the entire desired piece
of some separation player. If we give this piece to the segment player, the total utility of the
two players is bounded by 1; however, if we give the segment player a smaller piece and let the
separation player have her entire desired piece we achieve total utility > 1 without affecting
any of the other players. Therefore, we get that the only way to provide total utility of at least
4
3 |Ai| − 1 to the players created for Ai is to give each separation player her entire desired piece,
and let each segment player have a piece she values exactly at 13 . However, it is easy to observe
that to do that, at least one of the segment players must get her entire desired piece from the
segments range.
As in the proof for CEO, we would now like to transform the valuations into piecewise-
uniform ones. However, note that the property that each player has uniform value density on
all the intervals desired also by other players does not hold in the current construction. Namely,
a segment player has a desired interval common with other players in the compensation range,
and in addition another desired interval, which may have different value density in the segments
range, and this interval may also intersect other players’ desired intervals. However, this can
be remedied by splitting the desired intervals in the compensation range. Let (a, b) be one of
the intervals in the compensation range valued as worth 13 by two players p
j
i and p
j+1
i (a similar
idea can be used for the intervals desired by three players). We change the valuations of the
players so that now player pji values each of the intervals
(
a, a+b4
)
and
(2(a+b)
4 ,
3(a+b)
4
)
as worth
1
6 and similarly p
j+1
i values each of the intervals
(
a+b
4 ,
2(a+b)
4
)
and
(3(a+b)
4 , b
)
as worth 16 . After
this change, each player has at most one desired interval (in the segments range) that intersects
other players’ intervals, and we can transform the valuations into piecewise-uniform ones, as in
the prveious proof. This also maintains the property that the players created for Ai can get
total utility of 43 |Ai| − 1 iff at least one segment player gets her entire desired piece from the
segments range.
The strong NP-hardness of CUO and Discrete-CUO implies the following corollary:
Corollary 7. There is no FPTAS for either CUO nor Discrete-CUO.
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5 Welfare Maximization with Non-Connected pieces
In this section we analyze the problem of welfare maximization when each player may get a
collection of intervals. We first show that if the valuation functions are piecewise-constant and
are given explicitly to the algorithm, the problem can be easily solved in polynomial time using
a linear program almost identical to the one used by Cohler et al. [CLPP11].
Theorem 8. Given a set of n piecewise-constant valuation functions (i.e. for each i ∈ [n] the list
of intervals in which the value density function attains different values, along with the value for
each such interval), it is possible to find a division maximizing the utilitarian (resp. egalitarian)
welfare in polynomial time.
Proof. Given the set of valuation functions, it is useful to divide the interval [0, 1] into a set of
subintervals on which the value density function νi of every player i is constant. This can be
done by simply taking the union of all the boundary points of all the intervals in the description
of each νi, together with the points 0 and 1, and considering the set of intervals formed be every
two consecutive points in this set. Denote this set of intervals by J . Let I ∈ J and i ∈ [n];
since all a ∈ I have the same value νi(a) we slightly abuse notation and refer to this value as
νi(I).
Clearly, the division maximizing the utilitarian welfare gives each interval I ∈ J to the
player i with the maximum νi(I). Therefore, finding such a division is straightforward.
For finding a division maximizing the egalitarian welfare, we can solve the following linear
program:
maximize t
subject to
∑
I∈J
νi(I) · xIi ≥ t ∀i ∈ [n] (1)
∑
i∈[n]
xIi ≤ 1 ∀I ∈ J (2)
xIi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n], I ∈ J
Here, xIi indicates the portion of interval I given to player i. The constraint (1) makes sure that
each player obtains utility of at least t (which is the variable the program maximizes), and the
constraint (2) assures that we do not give away more than 100% of any interval. Therefore, by
solving the above program, we can find the egalitarian-optimal division in polynomial time.
In contrast to this positive result, it turns out that maximizing welfare is impossible if
instead of receiving the explicit functions, we only get oracle access to the valuations. In
particular, we show that no deterministic algorithm (even super-polynomial) can find a division
approximating the utilitarian or egalitarian optimum by a factor smaller than n. Note that this
bound is tight, as every proportional division5 approximates utilitarian and egalitarian welfare
by at least n, and many algorithms for finding proportional divisions do exist in the queries
model (see, e.g. [RW98] for a survey).
Theorem 9. For any ǫ > 0, no deterministic algorithm working in the oracle input model can
approximate utilitarian or egalitarian welfare to a factor of n − ǫ, when non-connected pieces
are allowed.
5Recall that a division is said to be proportional if it gives each player what she considers to be at least 1/n
of the total value of the cake.
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Proof. We discuss utilitarian welfare; the arguments for egalitarian welfare are analoguous. Let
A be a deterministic cake division algorithm working in the oracle input model, and fix some
n ∈ N and ǫ > 0. Consider the operation of the algorithm on the set of preferences in which
all players value the entire cake uniformly. In this case, the utilitarian welfare obtained cannot
exceed 1. We will now show that for any ǫ′ > 0 we can construct a different set of preferences
on which the algorithm outputs the same division (with the same welfare), but for which there
exists a division achieving utilitarian welfare of (1− ǫ′)n. The theorem will follow by choosing
ǫ′ = ǫ/n.
Let 0 = p0 < p1 < . . . < pk−1 < pk = 1 be the set of (distinct) points that appear in
the operation of the algorithm on the input above. I.e. {pi}ki=0 is the set of all points a, b for
which the algorithm makes a query vi(a, b) or receives an answer b = v
−1
i (a, x), and all the
points c in which the algorithm makes cuts in its output division. We create a new instance
in which the valuations in the interval between two each consecutive such points (pj , pj+1) are
“rearranged”. The value of this interval in the original instance, as well as in the new instance,
is ℓj = pj+1 − pj. We divide this interval into n + 1 “slivers”: the i-th sliver (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is
worth ℓj − ǫ′k to player i, and zero to everyone else. The n+ 1-st sliver of the interval is worth
ǫ′
k for all the players. Formally, for each player i and each 0 ≤ j ≤ k, set
v′i
(
pj +
i− 1
n+ 1
· ℓj , pj + i
n+ 1
· ℓj
)
= vi(pj, pj+1)− ǫ
′
k
v′i
(
pj +
n
n+ 1
· ℓj , pj+1
)
=
ǫ′
k
and have player i give value of 0 to any other piece.
We now have that for every 0 ≤ j ≤ j′ ≤ k it holds that v′i(pj, pj′) = vi(pj , pj′); furthermore,
for every 0 ≤ j ≤ k and every x ∈ R such that A makes a query v−1i (pj, x) when executed
on the preferences ~v we have v′−1i (pj, x) = v
−1
i (pj, x). Therefore, consider the operation of the
algorithm A on the set of valuations ~v′. The first query of A on this instance is clearly identical
to its first query on the instance ~v, since before any queries are asked A cannot distinguish
between the two instances. However, as we observed, the answer to A’s first query with the
new instance ~v′ to the answer with the original instance ~v. Since A is deterministic, this implies
that the next query asked by A on ~v′ is identical to that asked on ~v. Continuing in this manner,
we get that the entire operation of A is identical on both instances.
In particular, this implies that the cut points in the division produced for ~v′ are all from
the set {pj}kj=0. However, this means that in this division, every player has the same value as
it has in the division produced for ~v, and therefore the utilitarian welfare is 1. However, any
division giving each player all “slivers” only she gives positive value to yields utilitarian welfare
> (1− ǫ′)n, and the theorem follows.
6 Open Problems
In this work we have taken the first steps in studying the problem of maximizing welfare in cake
cutting with connected pieces. Many interesting problems related to this problem remain open.
First and foremost, we believe that it should be possible to obtain a reasonable approximation
for the problem of maximizing the egalitarian welfare. (We do have non-trivial algorithms
that achieve linear-factor approximations, but we conjecture that better algorithms can be
found.) We also conjecture that the approximation ratio for maximizing utilitarian welfare can
be improved; it may also be interesting to see if other inapproximability results can be shown.
Other interesting extensions include:
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• Strategic Behavior: One implicit assumption in our work was that we have access to the
(true) valuations of the players. In reality, the players may have incentive to lie about
their valuations. Guo and Conitzer [GC10] and Han et al. [HSTZ11] have considered this
problem for a somewhat different setting; the question of what can be achieved truthfully
in our setting is still open.
• 2-Dimensional Cake: The cake cutting literature has generally assumed a one-dimensional
cake; indeed, for the purpose of maintaining fairness, which was its main focus, a 2-
dimensional cake can be simply “projected” into one dimension, and divided fairly accord-
ing to the projection. However, this may result in a significant loss of welfare. Therefore,
maximizing welfare in allocation of 2-dimensional cakes may require completely different
tools and techniques.
Acknowledgment. We thank Zvi Gotthilf for many useful discussions.
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